A special campaign to address corruption in the coal resources sector, spanning a 20-year retrospective investigation.


Website of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission

 Website of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission

  Since the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region launched a special campaign to address violations and illegal activities in the coal‑resource sector, disciplinary inspection and supervision organs at all levels across the region have adopted a “bottom‑up approach,” conducting on-site inspections and oversight by unannounced visits that go straight to the front lines of coal‑related departments and enterprises. Pictured is a responsible official from the Discipline Inspection and Supervision Commission of Xilingol League visiting a mine in East Ujimqin Banner to learn about the latest progress of the special campaign. Photo by Liu Jianhua.

 

  The implementation of coal resource allocation policies has been lax, giving rise to issues such as arbitrary development and utilization and disordered resource allocation. The crude, extractive “mining and selling coal” development model has yet to undergo a fundamental transformation, and the phenomenon of “producing coal but lacking sufficient supply” persists. Moreover, during the restructuring process, there has been severe loss of state‑owned and collective assets; abuses such as misappropriating collective funds under the guise of restructuring coal‑related enterprises and embezzling state funds through equity transfers have become widespread.

  On July 17, 2020, with the completion of feedback on all special inspections conducted by the CPC Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Committee in the coal resources sector, a series of issues in that field were brought to light.

  For some time now, the coal‑resource sector in Inner Mongolia has been rife with widespread violations and illegal activities, which have become a long‑standing, deeply entrenched malaise—the most serious “cancer” and root cause of a polluted political environment. This problem must be tackled with the resolute determination to scrape away the bone and cure the poison, and it must be eradicated once and for all.

  Retrospective review of the past 20 years

  The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region is home to the world’s largest open-pit coal mines and serves as a vital energy‑security base for China. Of the region’s 12 leagues and cities, 11 have coal mines; there are currently 523 operating coal mines with an approved production capacity of 1.28 billion tons. Yet over the past period, this very “black gold” has, under the manipulation of certain audacious individuals with ulterior motives, become a breeding ground for corruption, casting layer upon layer of “gloom” over a grassland that should be graced by blue skies and white clouds.

  On July 16, 2020, the trial began in the bribery case involving Yun Guangzhong, former member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Party Committee and former Secretary of the Hohhot Municipal Party Committee. In October 2019, Yun Gongmin, the former deputy secretary of the Party Leadership Group and general manager of China Huadian Corporation, who had been retired for six years, was placed under investigation; he had previously served in two major coal-producing provinces and at the country’s largest coal enterprise. On October 25, 2018, Xing Yun, former vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, was subjected to disciplinary and legal review on suspicion of serious violations. On April 25, 2018, Bai Xiangqun, former vice governor of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, was also placed under investigation for alleged serious disciplinary and legal breaches, becoming the first high-ranking official to be brought down in Inner Mongolia since the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.

  On February 28 this year, in response to the violations and illegalities exposed in the coal‑resource sector by cases involving Yun Guangzhong, Bai Xiangqun, Xing Yun, Yun Gongmin, and others, the Party Committee and Government of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, acting on the disciplinary inspection and supervision recommendations of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission, convened a mobilization and deployment meeting for a special campaign to address irregularities and unlawful conduct in the region’s coal‑resource sector. The meeting explicitly stated that “a comprehensive review and diagnosis must be conducted of all coal‑resource development and utilization activities across the region since 2000.” This means that, over the past two decades, any related issues long buried in history will no longer enjoy impunity.

  Why conduct a retrospective investigation spanning 20 years?

  “Launching this special rectification campaign is a major political task entrusted to Inner Mongolia by the CPC Central Committee,” said Shi Taifeng, Secretary of the CPC Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Committee and Director of the Standing Committee of the Regional People’s Congress. “The most prominent problems in our region’s coal‑resource sector manifest themselves in the illegal and unlawful acquisition and resale of coal resources, the improper and unlawful allocation of such resources, and serious corruption linked to the coal industry—corruption that has severely poisoned the political environment. These issues have spread and proliferated, becoming the biggest ‘cancer’ and root cause of the contamination of our political ecosystem. They must be resolutely excised and completely eradicated.”

  On the very evening of the mobilization and deployment meeting, the Discipline Inspection Commission and the Supervisory Commission of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region publicly released the scope of accepted leads concerning alleged disciplinary violations, official misconduct, or official crimes in the coal‑resource sector since 2000. This list of leads primarily includes: illegally investing—whether under one’s own name or through nominee arrangements—in coal mines; leveraging official authority to secure illicit benefits for close relatives or individuals with special connections; colluding between officials and business interests; soliciting or accepting bribes; acting as a “protective umbrella” for unlawful mine operators; disciplinary and legal violations in areas such as planning and project approval, resource allocation, transfer of mining rights, coal‑resource integration and mergers/restructuring, environmental impact assessments, processing of mining‑rights applications, and disposition of mining‑rights revenues; as well as dereliction of duty, abuse of power, and corruption linked to coal‑mine safety accidents—among other matters.

  Full coverage is one of the defining features of this inspection. Since 2000, every stage—ranging from planning and project approval, investment review, resource allocation, environmental impact assessment, to the approval and filing of mining rights, equity changes, and mineral transactions—has been subject to scrutiny. The status of coal‑mining enterprises and the legal entities involved in coal‑related blending projects, along with details such as processing timelines, approval procedures, and the policy basis, will all be examined. Moreover, the goal is to establish a separate file for each mine and conduct a thorough, itemized review for every one.

  In accordance with the unified deployment of the Autonomous Region Party Committee, from March 27 to June 10, 2020, the seventh round of inspections by seven inspection teams under the Tenth-term Autonomous Region Party Committee conducted special inspections in the coal resources sector, covering seven league-level cities including Ordos, four departments and bureaus such as the Autonomous Region Department of Natural Resources, and three state-owned enterprises including Baotou Iron & Steel (Group) Co., Ltd. At the same time, the seven league-level cities concurrently established 21巡察 (inspection) teams, which worked in coordination with the Autonomous Region Party Committee’s inspection teams to carry out inspections of 237 coal-related departments and units.

  At the grassroots level across Inner Mongolia, discipline inspection and supervision commissions have also begun to step up their efforts under unified arrangements. The Tongliao Municipal Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision has established five supervisory teams to conduct a comprehensive review of leads related to coal‑resource issues since 2000, thoroughly investigating and exposing chains of illicit benefit transfers. The Xilingol League Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision has adopted a “chart‑based operational approach,” requiring all banners, counties, cities, and districts to rigorously carry out investigation and screening in strict accordance with pre‑determined timetables and roadmaps. Meanwhile, the Yijinhuoluo Banner Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision in Ordos City has implemented a “three‑fold strategy”: assigning leading officials to oversee operations, using visualized charts to guide work, and publicly posting oversight notices to ensure accountability. In Haibowan District of Wuhai City, the local commission has focused its efforts with precision, identifying integrity‑risk points in eight coal‑related departments, establishing communication and coordination mechanisms with 17 coal‑mining enterprises, and reviewing and cross‑checking the “Personal Information Collection Forms” submitted by more than 3,500 public officials.

  As Liu Qifan, a member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Committee, Secretary of the Commission for Discipline Inspection, and Director of the Supervisory Commission, has stated, launching a special campaign to address violations and illegal activities in the coal‑resource sector is vital to upholding strict Party self‑discipline and combating corruption, to purifying and restoring the political ecosystem, to regulating the economic order, and to ensuring the region’s high‑quality economic development and the well‑being of all ethnic groups. All disciplinary inspection and supervision organs at every level across the region, along with the vast ranks of discipline inspectors and supervisors, must elevate their political awareness, deeply appreciate the utmost importance and pressing urgency of this special campaign, earnestly shoulder their significant political responsibilities, and carry out the oversight work of the campaign in a solid and effective manner.

  Question Unlocked

  “Some have distorted and deviated from policies, failing to implement orders or heed prohibitions; they abuse their authority, issue approvals arbitrarily, and frequently engage in illegal acquisition and illicit trading of coal resources. Others have overstepped red lines in resource allocation, with lax review and oversight, false declarations, and glaring violations in the distribution of coal resources. Still others have carried out projects that cross red lines, with chaotic implementation of fire‑zone remediation initiatives, and practices such as ‘fraudulent coal’ and ‘illegal coal extraction’ persist…” Recently, as the autonomous region Party Committee’s inspection teams have successively communicated their findings to all inspected Party organizations, problems in the coal‑resource sector have been brought to light one by one.

  Moreover, the head of the special inspection team for the coal‑resource sector stated that other issues include: some entities have deviated from their leadership role in exercising oversight, engaging in unlawful, reckless, and arbitrary decision‑making; they have failed to fulfill their responsibilities in governance and rectification, resulting in ineffective enforcement; and illegal and boundary‑crossing mining practices are particularly prevalent. Others have abused their official positions to create and exploit rent‑seeking opportunities, leveraging their authority over resource allocation to engage in related‑party transactions and quid pro quo arrangements, with coal‑related corruption severely undermining the political environment. Still others treat coal resources as “Tang Monk’s flesh,” relying on coal to sustain themselves, exploiting mines for profit, and parasitizing enterprises. Furthermore, some have not fully implemented accountability for corrective measures, leaving superficial remediation and the recurrence of violations despite ongoing reforms.

  The inspection feedback left a deep impression on Zhuang Deshui, deputy director of the Center for Public Policy and the Center for Integrity Building at Peking University. “It can be said that the feedback pinpointed the crux of the problems in the coal‑resource sector, particularly by addressing the distinctive features of resource allocation and the exercise of power in this field, and put forward a series of targeted recommendations. Moreover, the feedback is systematic: it does not stop at superficial violations or illegalities, but delves into the deeper systemic and institutional issues within the coal‑resource sector, offering a comprehensive set of corrective measures.”

  “The findings are precise and the investigations thorough, aligning with the characteristics of power‑exercise in Inner Mongolia’s coal‑resource sector and with the patterns observed in corruption cases in recent years.” In Zhuang Deshui’s view, these feedback comments “will facilitate reform and innovation in Inner Mongolia’s coal‑resource field in the next phase and provide valuable guidance for future work.”

  This special inspection targets three categories of entities: first, the leagues and cities of Inner Mongolia, with inspections focused on the principal leadership teams of Party organizations in those leagues and cities that are rich in coal resources, emphasizing their fulfillment of primary responsibility in the coal‑resource sector; second, the autonomous region’s competent authorities, including decision‑making and oversight bodies; and third, state‑owned enterprises involved in the coal industry.

  “By bringing all three types of entities under the scope of this targeted rectification campaign, we have achieved full‑coverage oversight and, moreover, ensured comprehensive supervision and checks on the entire process of power exercise—covering decision‑making, implementation, and oversight powers in coal‑related sectors, as well as principal responsibilities at the macro level,” said Zhuang Deshui.

  According to reports, more than 90 percent of Inner Mongolia’s coal resources are concentrated in Ordos City, Xilingol League, and Hulunbuir City, making these regions the primary focus of this targeted rectification campaign.

  An analysis of the feedback from these three localities reveals a common pattern: all have fallen short in effectively implementing the CPC Central Committee’s major decisions and deployments. For instance, in Ordos City, “selective implementation of regulations governing the restructuring of coal‑related state‑owned enterprises has led to recurring issues, including the improper allocation of coal resources, the low‑price transfer of prospecting rights, and unauthorized changes to the equity structure of state‑owned coal mines.” In Xilingol League, “leadership over the restructuring of state‑owned coal mines has been weak, oversight has been inadequate, and problems such as the illegal acquisition and reselling of coal resources are particularly pronounced.” Meanwhile, in Hulunbuir City, “a simplistic, unregulated development model has been adopted to expand coal production capacity, attract coal projects, and allocate coal resources.”

  In addition, reporters have noted that many localities face problems in their political ecosystems. For example, in Ordos City, “the issue of leading cadres investing in and holding shares in coal mines is prone to frequent occurrence”; in Xilingol League, “certain leading cadres continue to engage in investment and shareholding in coal‑related enterprises, perpetuating the practice of ‘living off coal’”; and in Hulunbuir City, “there are instances of collusion between officials and business interests, with problems in the coal‑resource sector spreading and proliferating.”

  The problems within the industry’s regulatory authorities and state-owned coal enterprises have also come to light. The Autonomous Region Development and Reform Commission noted that “key areas harbor integrity risks, and certain leading cadres have engaged in unauthorized investments for profit in the coal‑resource sector.” The Department of Industry and Information Technology reported that “there are loopholes in the management of special funds related to coal, with significant latent risks of corruption.” Meanwhile, the Energy Administration found that “some leading cadres have abused their positions to seek personal gain by improperly profiting from the coal‑resource sector.” In general, the state‑owned enterprises inspected exhibited shortcomings in fulfilling their oversight responsibilities, characterized by laxity and a lack of rigor. Baotou Iron & Steel (Group) Co., Ltd. was found to engage in practices such as “exploiting the enterprise for personal gain” and “favoritism,” while Inner Mongolia Energy Construction Investment (Group) Co., Ltd. suffered from a pervasive “clique culture” and irregularities in personnel selection and appointment.

  Scraping the bone to remove the poison

  All verification issues must be thoroughly resolved and brought to a clear conclusion.

  During the special rectification campaign, while conducting field inspections and oversight in Xilingol League, Liu Qifan emphasized that a comprehensive review should be carried out—tracing back 20 years vertically and leaving no gaps or blind spots horizontally—to ensure that all issues are thoroughly identified and resolved. He stressed that this effort must continue until the desired results are achieved. To this end, cross‑verification and mutual confirmation between upper and lower levels should be employed, with coordinated, joint operations to compare and corroborate leads uncovered at different administrative tiers, among peers, and across relevant departments, thereby filling any gaps and addressing shortcomings.

  From project planning and approval to business registration, corporate name changes and shareholder amendments, as well as equity transactions and the transfer of mining rights, the targeted rectification campaign conducts thorough, in-depth inspections at every stage, leaving no detail overlooked—precisely to ensure that no single “loophole” is missed.

  Li Yongxian, former chief legal counsel of the Hohhot Coal Industry Group in Inner Mongolia; Xue Shengqi, former Party secretary and chairman of Inner Mongolia Energy Power Generation Investment Group Co., Ltd.; Mo Ruoping and Hao Shengfa, who served successively as Party secretaries and general managers of Inner Mongolia Coal Geological Exploration (Group) Co., Ltd.; Liu Wenguang, former Party secretary and chairman of Inner Mongolia Yihe Energy Group Co., Ltd.—as the targeted rectification campaign continues to advance, this growing list of officials brought down in response to the campaign spans multiple sectors across the autonomous region, including government bodies, the People’s Congress, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and state-owned enterprises.

  To date, over the past four-plus months, Inner Mongolia has seen several high-ranking coal officials brought down, with as many as six having previously served as heads of the coal administration bureau. For example, Guo Chengxin, former Party Secretary and Director of the Ordos Municipal Coal Administration Bureau, wielded extensive authority over the approval of local coal projects for eight years. In May this year, he was investigated—five years and three months after his retirement.

  Subsequently, several top officials from the former coal bureau branch in Ordos City were also placed under investigation one after another. On June 9, Wang Jun, Party Secretary and Director of the Energy Bureau of Jungar Banner, was investigated on suspicion of serious disciplinary and legal violations; on June 10, Wang Yongfeng, the former Director of the Coal Bureau of Dalad Banner, was investigated—by the time he was brought down, he served as a member of the Party Leadership Group and Deputy Director of the Standing Committee of the Dalad Banner People’s Congress; on the same day, Li Yan, the former Deputy Director of the Coal Bureau of Yijinhuoluo Banner, was also investigated; having once enjoyed a meteoric rise, he had already resigned from public office nearly eight years earlier. On June 16, Wei Zhanbiao, the former Director of the Coal Bureau of Dalad Banner, was investigated—by then, he had been retired for four years and four months.

  Some scholars argue that corruption can arise at multiple stages of the coal industry chain, but the most critical point lies in the transaction phase. Once leading officials take equity stakes, they act as investors, thereby representing shareholder interests; yet they also wield public authority, making them a special category of actors. “The conflation of these two roles readily gives rise to conflicts.”

  Based on the feedback from the inspection, Zhuang Deshui believes that the most pressing issues are concentrated in resource allocation. Specifically, serious problems exist at every stage—decision-making, implementation, and oversight. “When power is repeatedly misused at each level, it poses a grave risk to integrity; it is therefore hardly surprising that phenomena such as ‘seeking personal gain through coal’ and ‘living off coal’ have emerged.”

  He further analyzed that the frequent occurrence of corruption in the coal‑resource sector is closely linked to decision‑making, implementation, and oversight across the entire industry, as well as to the performance of duties by the relevant regulatory authorities and responsible officials. “From a systemic perspective, it is not simply a matter of problems arising at a single stage; rather, the entire system has developed corresponding shortcomings, which have allowed corruption to escalate.”

  “Scraping the bone to remove the poison.” In response to inspection feedback, the Party organizations under inspection must remain problem‑oriented, strengthen their political responsibility, and effectively address a number of salient issues in the coal‑resource sector and in the reform and development of state‑owned enterprises, ensuring that the political requirements of comprehensively and strictly governing the Party are fully implemented. They must firmly assign accountability for rectification, reinforce routine oversight, enhance organizational leadership over the rectification process, resolve problems item by item, and earnestly carry out the “second half” of the inspection work.

  “Corruption in the coal‑resource sector is not only attributable to regulatory gaps but also closely linked to the failure of some leading officials to assume responsibility and take action, as well as to an imperfect institutional framework. Consequently, retrospective investigations can both uncover current problems and, from a historical perspective, help identify their root causes,” said Zhuang Deshui. He added that this targeted rectification campaign not only reflects the deepening of inspection work but also serves as a vivid example of political oversight. More importantly, by leveraging such special campaigns and oversight mechanisms to advance reform, it lays the groundwork for deeper reforms and innovations in the coal‑resource sector going forward.